If the war in Ukraine was a book, we could be approaching the showdown stage, followed, hopefully, by an epilogue. The showdown, of course, is the Ukrainian offensive, expected anytime.

Over the last months, the frontlines were frozen, with the notable exception of Bakhmut, where, in contrast, intensive fighting took place over a sliver of space of seven square kilometres.

Russia used this time to bring 200.000 additional troops and build fortifications on the contact line of territories it holds in the regions of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk, in particular by planting “dragon teeth”, concrete pyramids intended to be an obstacle for tanks.

Ukraine also used this time to gather armament from the West, including tanks, and to train its forces.

It also conducted operations to psychologically destabilise the enemy, including drone attacks on Russian territory. Russia suddenly discovered that the frontline wasn’t 1,000 but 1,600 kilometres, including the poorly guarded border with Russia proper.

To date, the psychological advantage is with Ukraine, as Russia is busy trying to guess where exactly the Ukrainian offensive will hit.

But Russia should not be underestimated, as it had a long time to prepare, its intelligence is working, and it reportedly succeeded in destroying some of the stocks of Western armament on Ukrainian territory.

Whenever Ukraine dealt a blow to Russia – be it the attack on the Kerch bridge or drone attacks – Moscow retaliated with a hail of missiles or drones at Kyiv. Most of them were intercepted by the Ukrainian air defence, but as a result, both sides were depleted of projectiles.

The war in Ukraine made the West realise that it had no sufficient ammunition to fight a conventional war, and this is why the Commission launched an initiative to boost production.

Russia, in turn, relies on its reserves, which are not infinite, while Western sanctions and internal misgovernance prevent it from securing fresh production.

Right now, it is unrealistic to imagine a diplomatic end to the war because both sides believe in victory.

If the Ukrainian offensive leads to liberating the occupied territories, it is possible to imagine a collapse of the Russian army. That, of course, could be the end of the war.

But if the Ukrainian offensive would lead to the kind of conflict we have seen in Bakhmut, only on a bigger scale, that would be a bigger risk for the peace in the world.

Ukraine is a democratic country, it cannot accept a massive death toll over many years.

And at some point, the Russian army will exhaust its conventional weapons capacities and be tempted to use tactical nuclear weapons.

The rationale is very simple: As the conventional arsenals are melting down, the nuclear threshold is getting closer. A protracted war will inevitably become nuclear.

If this happens, the US has warned that without resorting to nuclear weapons, it will inflict a major conventional blow to the Russian army, for example, by sinking its entire Black Sea fleet.

From this moment, the nuclear holocaust could happen anytime.

The Ukrainian offensive is thus the decisive point.

If the offensive starts in July, by September it should be abundantly clear which scenario prevails.

In both cases, the international community should do its utmost to end the war.

And even in the worst scenario, as soon as peace is restored, Ukraine should become a member of NATO to shield itself from another Russian attack in the future.

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