Iran and the limits of Europe’s rules-based faith
Tel Aviv, Israel – As Iran, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf become engulfed in missiles and bombs, social media and much of the airwaves, notably in Europe and the West, have as ever commenced in parallel conflict.
Moving aside from the eternal and predictable pro- and anti-US or Israel exchanges, an interesting stream of mutual baiting and self-righteousness is unfolding that is particularly relevant to the EU: does the joint US-Israeli attack comply with international law?
The short answer is no. The long answer is: the relevance may be quite different for the US than for Israel. Lawyers may view the case differently, but as a historian of war I suggest the following considerations may be useful.
The short answer is simple, in the sense that this was a pre-emptive strike and it may be difficult to prove that the Iranian regime was preparing a strike against the US or Israel that endangered either imminently. To many in the region, not just in Israel but also Sunni and Christian people in Iran, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq – not to mention the widely reported pressure Saudi Arabia apparently put on the US to
attack – that may not be a realistic position.
Which leads to the long answer. Iran was deemed to have given impetus to the Shia Crescent since the late 1990s. Spanning the states noted above, it utilised such organisations as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, alongside the murderous Assad regime in Syria and the near-dependent Iraqi government. As a result, many in the region feel the need for relief from the war and disorder emanating from the Crescent, however that relief arrives.
Israel has long been at the forefront of retaliation, notably in the past year when it eliminated the leadership and much of the power of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which led to the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, the elimination of Syrian air power and the ousting of Russia from the state it too had been manipulating alongside Iran.
It is doubtful whether that operation stood up to international law, though it allowed massive relief to both Lebanon and Syria after many years of war and oppression. It is also unclear whether Israel’s attack on Iran in June 2025 was even remotely compliant with categories of international law, but it clearly weakened the Iranian regime. Once again, from the regional non-Shia perspective, that was an important outcome.
The US position is less clear. Iran may be deemed a threat to its military assets in the Gulf region and the wider Middle East, and undoubtedly so if it gained a nuclear capability – but only in the remote sense. Realistically, Iran is not a core problem for the US. Rather, it is a core enemy going back to the 1979 revolution that brought the Ayatollah regime to power and humiliated the US, both by ousting the Shah’s regime it supported (and which was installed by the CIA in 1953) and of course by then taking its embassy staff hostage for 444 days.
Retribution has been a US aim for decades, which may be the only legitimacy the US needs, especially for the Trump administration. And the US has a history of overlooking international law — as in Iraq in 2003 (Afghanistan could be claimed as self-defence after the attacks of 9/11) or indeed its strikes against Iran in June 2025, to use just two examples.
The EU, conversely, has long been a guardian of international law. But as ever, it is sitting by the sidelines, pretending to be relevant and hoping the problem will go away. And as ever, this cannot be a realistic position: apart from legal issues, the Middle East is just next door to Europe, and many of the immigrants it seeks to be rid of arrive from the war zones of that region. Far more than the US, the EU has an interest in this fight; it should sit up and take a position.
International law – not least in response to the two world wars and then the Cold War – evolved with the intention of stopping states from invading or attacking each other without clear cause. In a perfect world, that would be wonderful. But the evolution of the law has become detached from reality. Examining the specific issues while ignoring the suffering of people has not made the system workable — or popular.
Many in Iran were left angry that Western specialists had remarkably few comments when the regime was slaughtering protestors in January, but are quick to condemn the military action now. This is also true for people in Syria, who wondered why international law was rarely discussed while they were being massacred by their regime. Or the people of Iraq, who were not only murdered by Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime, but also subsequently during the US-led occupation.
The list is long, but it leads to a clear reflection: the guardians of international law need a reality check if they are to preserve its value. If it can do nothing else, the EU should spearhead that initiative.


