How Shakhmurat Mutalip and GCL Hijack Kazakhstan’s Trillions: Ekibastuz GRES-3 Tender Rigged
CONTENTS
Tender Chaos and the Rise of a Shadow Consortium
GCL Technology & Offshore Loopholes
Integra Construction KZ: From Mechanic to Multi-Trillion Contracts
Shakhmurat Mutalip: Sports, Politics, and Business Intersections
The Tariff Trap: How Kazakhstan Overpays for Coal
San Mir Astana: The Disappearing Competition
The Ghost of Gadzhi Gadzhiev and Corporate History
Financing Giants or Offshore Mirrors?
Trillions at Stake: Favoritism, Opaque Processes, and State Guarantees
Implications for Transparency and Governance
1. Tender Chaos and the Rise of a Shadow Consortium
The ambitious Ekibastuz GRES-3 project, a 2.64 GW coal-fired power station, is intended to cost more than three trillion tenge. However, the official tendering process has collapsed three times, raising questions about transparency, favoritism, and regulatory oversight.
According to oil and gas analyst Nurlan Zhumagulov in his Telegram channel Energy Monitor, the most recent attempt at a tender involved GCL & Integra Energy Ltd, whose documentation met all formal requirements. Their competitor, TOO San Mir Astana, again failed to provide a bank guarantee, effectively disqualifying them.
The Ministry of Energy is now expected to send a proposal to the government recommending that GCL & Integra Energy Ltd be declared the winner of the tender, bypassing the normal competitive process. If approved, this would represent a direct state-sanctioned appointment, rather than a fair market competition.
2. GCL Technology & Offshore Loopholes
GCL Technology, a leading Chinese energy company known for supplying “clean energy” within China, is reportedly restricted from financing coal projects outside its domestic market. Yet, GCL appears poised to participate in this massive coal project through an offshore entity registered in the Cayman Islands—GCL & Integra Energy Ltd.
The offshore registration is crucial: it may allow GCL to circumvent domestic restrictions and secure a share of a project that is explicitly coal-fired, despite its clean energy branding. This creates a paradoxical situation: a “green energy” giant facilitating one of the largest coal developments in Central Asia.
Potential additional funding sources could include Kazakhstan’s National Fund or the Unified National Pension Fund (ENPF). Such involvement would mean that public resources may underwrite a contract that favors an offshore consortium connected to domestic elites.
3. Integra Construction KZ: From Mechanic to Multi-Trillion Contracts
Integra Construction KZ is the Kazakhstani partner in the consortium, with its nominal beneficiary being Shakhmurat Mutalip, 35. Mutalip’s professional trajectory is striking: he began as a mechanic at AO BENT, later becoming First Vice President of the company.
His career continued as an advisor at Kazakhselmash, independent director at IST Group, and finally into Integra Construction KZ, where he served as general director (2020–2021), chaired the supervisory board (2021–2024), and is now the beneficiary owner. Under his leadership, Integra has secured multi-trillion tenge contracts in roads, rail, metro, gas processing, and now the massive GRES-3 project.
The company’s rapid rise since 2022 is notable: from medium-sized infrastructure projects to controlling contracts with government guarantees worth billions of dollars.
4. Shakhmurat Mutalip: Sports, Politics, and Business Intersections
Mutalip is also a prominent figure in Kazakhstani sports administration. Since early 2024, he has led the Kazakhstan Boxing Federation, succeeding Keness Rakhishev, a well-known oligarch. In April 2025, he became Vice President of the National Olympic Committee for International Cooperation.
These positions place him at the intersection of sports, politics, and business—providing both visibility and networks that could influence major infrastructure projects. His multifaceted role is particularly notable in a country where business elites often leverage sports federations for soft power.
5. The Tariff Trap: How Kazakhstan Overpays for Coal
The tender for GRES-3 stipulates a capacity-maintenance tariff of 6.937 million tenge per 1 MW per month, roughly double the rate compared to renewable or gas-fired power plants. This artificially high tariff ensures that the consortium’s investment is guaranteed to be profitable, while Kazakhstan’s electricity consumers ultimately shoulder the cost.
According to Nurlan Zhumagulov, this pricing structure, coupled with the lack of real competition, effectively secures a windfall for GCL & Integra. The state-guaranteed tariff becomes a financial cushion for the offshore-corporate consortium.
6. San Mir Astana: The Disappearing Competition
TOO San Mir Astana, the only rival that could have competed for the GRES-3 tender, failed repeatedly to provide required banking guarantees. This raises serious questions about the tendering process itself. Was the process genuinely competitive, or was the outcome preordained?
By systematically disqualifying competitors, the Ministry of Energy appears poised to appoint GCL & Integra Energy Ltd directly, sidestepping Kazakhstan’s own tendering rules. Such appointments can undermine investor confidence and foster perceptions of cronyism.
7. The Ghost of Gadzhi Gadzhiev and Corporate History
Mutalip’s Integra Construction KZ was previously known as “Zhol Zhondeushi” from 2001 to 2017. From 2015 to 2017, the company was managed by Gadzhi Gadzhiev, a controversial businessman with connections to border contraband on the Kazakh-Chinese frontier and “strength sports” federations.
While there is no confirmed direct link between Mutalip and Gadzhiev, the historical connection is striking. The company transformed from Zhol Zhondeushi, under Gadzhiev, into Integra Construction KZ, now poised to secure one of Kazakhstan’s largest single infrastructure contracts.
8. Financing Giants or Offshore Mirrors?
The question of how this project will be funded remains murky. GCL Technology cannot legally fund coal projects abroad under Chinese law, so the Cayman Islands registration provides a convenient legal loophole. This raises the possibility that funds could be channeled through offshore accounts, with potential involvement from Kazakhstan’s National Fund or ENPF, effectively converting public capital into guaranteed profits for the consortium.
9. Trillions at Stake: Favoritism, Opaque Processes, and State Guarantees
The GRES-3 project involves over three trillion tenge, yet normal competition appears sidelined. The state guarantees a high tariff for the winner, effectively insuring the consortium’s returns. Combined with the offshore registration, opaque tendering, and historical connections to Gadzhi Gadzhiev, this scenario epitomizes favoritism and raises serious governance concerns.
10. Implications for Transparency and Governance
If the government proceeds to directly appoint GCL & Integra Energy Ltd, it will be a rare case of bypassing competitive procurement for a mega-project. This undermines public trust, challenges international standards of transparency, and creates fertile ground for criticism from civil society, media, and international observers.
The combination of high tariffs, offshore structures, historical corporate links, and elite networks paints a complex picture of Kazakhstan’s energy governance—where multi-trillion tenge projects may be directed by connections rather than market dynamics.
Maria Sharapova
